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Scientists have been arguing about the ben-efits of venturing into space since beforethe space age began. Indeed, the ambiva-
lence, and to some extent the short-sighted-
ness, of the astronomical establishment
towards space exploration is well illustrated by
its famous dismissal as “utter bilge” by the
incoming Astronomer Royal, Richard Woolley,
in January 1956 (Woolley 1956).
Although Woolley’s off-the-cuff remark is
often quoted out of context (it was actually
aimed at speculations about interplanetary
travel, rather than at the technical feasibility of
launching objects into space), it is perhaps
revealing of a widespread scepticism among
astronomers about the value of space research
that, four years later, the Astronomer Royal
was still able to doubt the scientific usefulness
of even artificial satellites (Woolley 1960). For-
tunately for astronomy, the other side of this
debate, championed most notably by Lyman
Spitzer (e.g. Spitzer 1946, 1960), carried the
day, and the enormous scientific benefits of
space astronomy are now clear for all to see. 
However, while the fundamental scientific
contributions of unmanned space probes are
now universally acknowledged, arguments
continue about the scientific role of people in
space. Primarily, these concern the scientific
relevance of the International Space Station,
and proposals for human missions to Mars.
But before discussing these future issues, we
should perhaps consider the scientific legacy of
the most ambitious human space flight pro-
gramme to date.
The legacy of Apollo
It is well known that the primary driving forces
behind the Apollo project were geopolitical
rather than scientific. Indeed, it is naive to
believe that anything other than powerful
political motives (which at the time were firm-
ly rooted within the context of the Cold War)
could have sustained a project which, at its
peak, consumed over 4% of the US federal
budget. The key question here, however, con-
cerns the extent to which scientific knowledge
was increased as a result of the Apollo project,
regardless of the political forces behind it.
The fact that Apollo was expensive and not
primarily science driven seems to have irritated
many in the scientific community, and has even
caused some to deny that it had any scientific
relevance at all. For example, on the eve of the
Apollo 11 landing, the Astronomer Royal,
alluding to his remarks over a decade earlier,
asserted that “from the point of view of astro-
nomical discovery it [the Moon landing] is not
only bilge but a waste of money” (Woolley
1969). Indeed, 25 years after Apollo I over-
heard a senior astronomer making exactly the
same point at a dinner party.
The truth, of course, is that science was an
enormous beneficiary of Apollo, primarily
because of the 382 kg of lunar rock samples
returned to Earth. The analysis of this materi-
al has had a huge impact on our understand-
ing, not only of lunar history, but of the early
evolution, and indeed the origin, of the solar
system as a whole. By permitting an absolute
calibration of the impact-cratering rate, the
dating of these samples provided strong sup-
port for the theory of terrestrial planet forma-
tion by planetesimal accretion, as well as our
only reliable method of estimating planetary
surface ages throughout the solar system. 
Moreover, their geochemical analysis, which
demonstrated the compositional similarity of
the Moon to the Earth’s mantle, provided one
of the main arguments for the “giant impact”
theory of lunar origins (Hartmann and Davis
1975), which further supports models of the
merger of planetesimals in the early solar sys-
tem (Wetherill 1990). The composition of these
samples is now being used to calibrate the
excellent multispectral images of the Moon
recently obtained by the Clementine spacecraft
(e.g. Blewett et al. 1997). Nor should we forget
the geophysical studies carried out during the
Apollo project, most notably of the lunar inte-
rior by means of active seismology – the Moon
is still the only planetary body, apart from the
Earth, whose structure has been probed in this
way (see Goins et al. 1981 for a review).
The opponents of human space flight will
argue that all this could have been achieved
much more cheaply with robotic missions.
However, I think this is a mistake. While it is
true that much of the Apollo science could, in
principle, have been performed robotically,
there must be considerable doubt as to how
much would actually have happened had the
manned landings not taken place. For exam-
ple, although it is true that three unmanned
Soviet space probes (Lunas 16, 20 and 24) suc-
cessfully collected 321 g of lunar material in
the 1970s, it is notable that this was less than
0.1% of the amount returned by the Apollo
missions. Moreover, the Apollo material con-
sisted of more than 2000 individual samples,
intelligently collected from many locations
around each landing site, while the Luna mate-
rial consisted of a single core from each site.
No practical, or (within a purely scientific bud-
get) affordable, robotic programme could have
returned anywhere near the quantity, or the
diversity, of the Apollo lunar samples.
It is, of course, quite obvious why the Apollo
missions were able to carry a large quantity of
scientific equipment to the Moon, and to
return with hundreds of kilograms of rock
samples. As each flight had to transport three
men and all their life-support equipment to the
Moon anyway (in order to satisfy the political
objectives of the programme), the marginal
cost of carrying bulky scientific equipment
(such as the seismic arrays and their explosive
charges), and of bringing back the rock sam-
ples, was a negligible fraction of the total cost.
This illustrates an important scientific advan-
tage of human space flight: any space mission
that has to transport people will, by its very
nature, be able to carry a significant scientific
pay-load, even if science is not the primary dri-
ver for the mission.
The Space Station
The International Space Station (ISS) is anoth-
er major human space project which is not pri-
marily science driven. Predictably, therefore, it
has again raised the ire of those in the scientif-
ic community who confuse an absence of over-
riding scientific purpose with scientific worth-
lessness. The ISS, like Apollo before it, is being
built primarily for political reasons (many of
which, like the encouragement of international
co-operation, are good reasons) but this does
not mean that science will not be a beneficiary
(see Lewis 1998 for a review). It may be true
that the proposed scientific uses of the ISS,
such as microgravity and life science research,
could never justify the construction costs of the
ISS on their own, but they are nevertheless
important scientific disciplines which stand to
benefit substantially from it. Even astronomy
is likely to benefit, with the recent proposal to
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place an all-sky X-ray monitor on board (Mat-
suoka et al. 1997), and other astronomical
applications are likely to follow.
The real significance of the ISS, however, is
that it will help lay the foundations for future
space programmes with vastly greater scientif-
ic potential. There are three aspects to this.
Firstly, the ISS will provide considerable expe-
rience in space engineering; although many sci-
entists are sceptical of the suggested scientific
applications of the ISS itself, a moment’s reflec-
tion will show that considerable scientific
advantages are likely to follow from the ability
to construct large structures (e.g. telescopes
and interferometers) in space.
Secondly, studies of the physiological effects
of weightlessness to be conducted on the ISS
will be essential before human beings are able
to undertake long journeys to other planets in
the solar system. Notwithstanding the objec-
tions of the critics of human space flight, I shall
argue below that the scientific returns of such
missions are likely to be considerable.
The third point concerns the development of
new institutional arrangements for the man-
agement of complex international space pro-
jects. Indeed, one space analyst has already
expressed the view that “in effect, an interna-
tional space agency has been created for the
station” (Logsdon 1998). This may be over-
stating things at present, but there are strong
reasons for believing that, if humanity is to
have a significant future in space, something
along these lines will be both necessary and
desirable (Crawford 1992). If experience in
building and operating the ISS helps to develop
the institutional foundations for a future world
space programme, that alone will be one of its
most important legacies. 
Let us now consider the scientific opportuni-
ties of human space flight in the post-ISS era.
A return to the Moon
There are broadly three scientifically important
reasons for humans to return to the Moon:
 Science on the Moon. The Moon is an
important object of scientific study in its own
right, and one that is likely to continue to pro-
vide major insights into the origin and evolu-
tion of the solar system. However, a moment’s
reflection will reveal that we have not yet
achieved anything like a complete understand-
ing of its structure, environment, or history.
This is especially obvious when we consider
that all our lunar samples and in situ measure-
ments have come from low to mid latitudes on
the nearside only. Thus the scientific case for
renewed lunar exploration is extremely strong,
and, as for Apollo, I suggest that more explo-
ration will be carried out as part of a manned
programme than if we rely exclusively on
robotic means.
 Science from the Moon. The potential
advantages of the Moon as a platform for
astronomical observations have been reviewed
extensively elsewhere (e.g. Burns and Mendell
1988, Burns et al. 1990), and I will not repeat
them all here. Briefly, they arise from the sta-
bility of the lunar surface (possibly an advan-
tage for the construction of long-baseline
optical/IR interferometers); the slow rotation
period of the Moon (permitting very long inte-
gration times on a single object); the extreme
cold (<100 K) in shadowed areas (a significant
advantage for infrared instruments); and the
extreme radio-quietness of the lunar farside
(probably the best site for radio astronomy
anywhere in the solar system). It may be that
some of these applications could, in principle,
be performed from unmanned space observa-
tories. However, the point here is that a human
return to the Moon, undertaken for whatever
reason, is likely to provide astronomy with
great opportunities which might not otherwise
be practical or affordable.
 Experience gained on the Moon. Finally, a
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One of the eight explosive packages deployed at the Apollo 17 landing site as part of the active seismic
profiling experiment. This view is from the lunar roving vehicle (LRV) towards the Sculptured Hills (which
border Mare Serenitatis) 4 km to the east. The Apollo 17 lunar module, where the geophone array was set






/astrogeo/article-abstract/39/6/6.14/203443 by Birkbeck C
ollege, U
niversity of London user on 20 August 2019
human return to the Moon would provide
experience in living and working on hostile
planetary surfaces. This will be particularly
important when it comes to constructing
human outposts elsewhere in the solar system,
and in particular on the surface of Mars.
The case for Mars
The well-worn arguments against sending peo-
ple to Mars have been reiterated by Sleep
(1997), who asserts that this would be “the
most dangerous, costly, inefficient and counter-
productive method yet devised for exploring
the Red Planet”, and that machines could do it
all much better. I certainly agree that the robot-
ic exploration of Mars to date has been a
tremendous success, and that the collection,
early in the next century, of a few kilograms of
Mars rock by a robotic sample return mission
will be of tremendous scientific importance.
However, a moment’s reflection will show that
a proper exploration of Mars will require a lot
more than this.
The ultimate aim of planetary science must
be to understand the other planets to the same
extent that we understand the Earth, and even
that is far from complete. Mars has a surface
area approximately equal to the land area of
Earth, and by all accounts it has had a highly
complicated geological, climatological, and,
possibly, biological history. To reach anything
like an adequate understanding of Mars will
require, as a minimum, the analysis of tonnes
(possibly thousands of tonnes) of rocks collect-
ed from all over the planet; it will require mag-
netic, gravity and seismic surveys; and it will
require boreholes, probably kilometres deep,
drilled in selected regions. The idea that this
could be achieved with half a dozen robot lan-
ders is frankly ridiculous.
Consider the most important scientific ques-
tion which needs to be addressed on Mars: did
life evolve when, some 3.5 to 4 billion years
ago, liquid water flowed on its surface and
conditions were similar to those that prevailed
on Earth when life evolved here? Recent work
on the origin of life (e.g. de Duve 1996) is close
to predicting that life ought to have evolved on
Mars at that time. It is hugely important for
our understanding of the origin of life, and
indeed for the whole science of biology, to
ascertain whether or not it did so, and, if it did,
how similar Martian lifeforms were to terres-
trial ones. An answer to this question will
require procedures similar to those used to find
the oldest microfossils on Earth (e.g. Schopf
1993): it will be necessary to conduct a
detailed search for Martian sedimentary rocks
of the appropriate age, to determine their geo-
logical and palaeo-environmental context, and
to painstakingly sift through them with micro-
scopes. It is very difficult to see how such a
programme could be conducted satisfactorily
with robots alone.
Space infrastructure
The main point I want to make is that science
stands to benefit greatly from exploiting the
technology, and especially the infrastructure,
developed to support a human space flight
capability. By infrastructure I mean all the
background capabilities (for example, launch-
ers, spaceports, space stations, interplanetary
transports, lunar and planetary outposts)
which purely scientific budgets could never
afford to develop, but which nevertheless act
to facilitate scientific research which would not
otherwise take place. We have seen how this
worked in the case of Apollo, and how the ISS
will provide infrastructural support for a wide
range of scientific investigations.
The in-orbit repair of the Hubble Space Tele-
scope (HST) in 1993 provides a good example
of the usefulness of a human space flight infra-
structure. Sleep (1997) has rather disparaging-
ly asserted that this was only to correct a fault
of NASA’s own making, but this misses the
point entirely: without that human interven-
tion in space we would still be stuck with the
uncorrected telescope, and astronomy would
be greatly impoverished as a consequence.
Moreover, the first HST refurbishment mission
(STS 61) didn’t just install the corrective optics
(COSTAR), it also replaced the solar panels,
installed new gyros, repaired the GHRS, and
installed WF/PC2. A subsequent astronaut-
tended upgrade last year (STS 82) installed two
new instruments (STIS and NICMOS), and
two further deliveries of new instruments are
planned. Thus the HST experience clearly illus-
trates the scientific advantages of being able to
call upon the capabilities of a human space
flight infrastructure when the need arises
(something already foreseen by Spitzer 1974).
Future potential
Considerable as these advantages have been,
however, they pale into insignificance com-
pared to those potentially available in the
future. We have already outlined the likely sci-
entific benefits of human outposts on the
Moon and Mars, and alluded to the possibili-
ties for building large astronomical instru-
ments in space. Other possibilities include the
development, and in-space construction, of
interplanetary vehicles capable of taking
human crews to both near-Earth and Main Belt
asteroids, and to the Galilean satellites of
Jupiter. In the case of the asteroids, the prima-
ry motivation for human exploration is likely
to be economic rather than scientific (e.g.
Lewis et al. 1993), but it seems clear that our
knowledge of these objects, and thus of the
early history of the solar system, would be
greatly increased as a consequence. As regards
the Galilean satellites, the arguments for
human exploration closely follow those
already advanced for the Moon and Mars.
Consider Europa, for example, a world almost
as large as our Moon and which is of biologi-
cal interest owing to the likely presence of an
ocean of liquid water below its icy crust. How
much of the history, structure and environment
of this important object will it be possible to
piece together from robotic missions alone?
In the more distant future, we should keep in
mind the enormous scientific opportunities
that would result from the ability to construct
fast (v > 0.1c) interstellar space probes (Craw-
Exploration of space
6.16 December 1998  Vol 39
Astronaut Kathryn Thornton with the corrective optics (COSTAR) unit during the first servicing mission to the
Hubble Space Telescope in December 1993. Astronaut Tom Akers is at left. The blue skies of Earth are
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ford 1990). However, it is important to under-
stand that the construction of even an
unmanned interstellar probe will entail large-
scale engineering work in space (see Mallove
and Matloff 1989, and Crawford 1990 for
reviews), and will only be possible once the
necessary infrastructure has been developed. 
Wider motives for human space flight
I have argued above that science has been, and
will continue to be, a major beneficiary of
human space flight, and that the vociferous
opposition to it from some quarters of the sci-
entific community is badly misplaced. It seems
to me that most of this opposition, from
Richard Woolley onwards, stems from two
implicit, but erroneous, assumptions: first, that
the primary motives for sending people into
space are, or at least ought to be, scientific; and
second, that the high cost of human space
flight is taken from existing scientific budgets. 
In fact, ambitious human space projects are
undertaken for a variety of reasons, most of
which are sociopolitical in nature rather than
scientific. In the case of Apollo these arose
from the perceived imperatives of the Cold
War, and are now thankfully behind us. How-
ever, compelling social and political arguments
in support of human space flight remain. These
range from the economic (where major space
initiatives act as high technology “public
works” projects, having a significant multipli-
er effect on the economy as a whole; e.g.
Bezdek and Wendling 1992), to the geopoliti-
cal (especially the encouragement of co-
operation between former Cold War adver-
saries). In the future, powerful sociopolitical
reasons for human space flight are likely to
include the demands of the world economy for
extraterrestrial raw materials, and the continu-
ing need for high-profile international projects
as aids in building a stable geopolitical envi-
ronment here on Earth (Crawford 1995).
Quite frankly, these arguments are sufficiently
strong to justify a major human space pro-
gramme even in the absence of any scientific
benefits whatsoever.
As the complex motivations for human space
flight are not primarily scientific, it follows
that they are not, and indeed cannot be,
financed primarily from scientific budgets.
Consider the US space programme: NASA cur-
rently has an annual budget of approximately
$14 billion (which, to put things in perspective,
is only about 5% of the US military budget).
However, this should not be perceived as a sci-
ence budget per se, because NASA is not pri-
marily a science agency (US Congress 1958).
There are those in the scientific community
who seem to believe that if only NASA was not
operating the Space Shuttle, or contributing to
the ISS, then the whole $14 billion would be
available for space science. However, as we
have seen, the former activities are motivated
primarily by politically worthwhile, but 
generally non-scientific, policy objectives of the
US government; if the money was not spent on
manned space flight it would more likely be
spent on military hardware, welfare payments,
or tax cuts than on science.
It is true that there is currently a grey area
where the manned and unmanned budgets
sometimes have to compete for funds within
NASA, and that there has been a history of
cost overruns in the former decreasing provi-
sion for the latter (Van Allen 1986). However,
while this is certainly unfortunate, it is really
an argument for reform of the way NASA’s
budget is allocated by the US Congress rather
than for the abandonment of a human space
flight capability. Pursuing the latter course
would only marginally increase the funds
available for space science in the short term,
but would prevent the long-term development
of a space infrastructure from which science
stands to gain so much.
Science education
Nor should we overlook the stimulus to scien-
tific and technical education provided by high-
profile human space activities. This extends
well beyond stimulating young people to
embark on careers in science and engineering,
important though that is, but also leads to an
increased scientific awareness throughout soci-
ety. Sagan (1994) put it eloquently: “Explor-
atory space flight puts scientific ideas, scientif-
ic thinking, and scientific vocabulary in the
public eye. It elevates the general level of intel-
lectual inquiry.” The whole scientific enterprise
has the greatest possible interest in encourag-
ing this process.
Conclusion
While recognizing that many of the driving
forces behind human space flight are social and
political, rather than narrowly scientific, it
seems clear that science has been, and will con-
tinue to be, a major beneficiary of having 
people in space. What, after all, is the alterna-
tive? We can either stay at home, sending a few
robot spacecraft to our neighbouring planets,
and continuing to gaze at the more distant uni-
verse across light years of empty space, or we
can get ourselves out among the planets and,
eventually, the stars. In which alternative
future would we learn the most about this uni-
verse and our place within it? 
I A Crawford is in the Department of Physics and
Astronomy, University College, London.
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